1/27/98

Wyler Tromp

Have spoken to Winston Lord
Negroponte
will see Bui Diem
— Tony Lake
— Chester Cooper
— Frank Snepp

trying to get HAR
McN has refused

Schell:

Gorbachev: Those who now seek to abolish nuclear weapons, stand on the shoulders of those who from within overthrew the totalitarian system of the SU.

A pronounced suicidal bent (holding a pistol to our own heads);

and just as strange, "experts" still say we have no choice but to maintain this suicidal threat despite absence/collapse of total. enemy, which was argued to make it necessary before. Suicidal bent from within our society

People of West must lead the way in abolishing the total. system of nuc terror(ism).

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McNamara

~40,000 nucs

1M × Hiroshima

START I 10,0

Helsinki Summit about 6000 × Hiroshima.

Survivors of an exchange couldn't

No change in our strategy.

Nucs: no military utility, other than to deter nucs—and if opponent doesn't have any, you don't need them.

Use against a non-nuc opponent

NOT NEEDED TO deter or respond to use of CBW.

McN

If there were no risk to *maintaining* these weapons, why not maintain? But there *is* a risk — see C-II; we just barely lucked out — misinformation, miscalculation, [mis-statements] despite it's being the *most* perfectly-managed crisis in last ~~[illegible]~~ 50 years.

NAS: notion that arms can be maintained indefinitely and never used defies credibility.

Risk of some cheating under ban
Risk that without ban we will destroy nations.
I know which I would take.

[Blair, to me: yes, PDD should be available to and debated by Congress — like mine, 1978 (Carter: PD-59) Reagan, or earlier NSDM — under Schlesinger (Nixon). Never has been, though Blair got some in working for OTA, Congress; though his report, TS + ~~compartmented~~ codeword, was classified as "SIOP-ESI" by DOD and removed from him (he had that in USAF, but not for OTA).

[If possession of arms made large-scale conventional war "*impossible/obsolete*" or nearly so, it would... present a dilemma; there would be a strong case for it. But the 50 years lack of a "major" war during CW doesn't indicate that effect (to suppose that is to suppose that only arms held SU back, (Churchill), that without them that SU would have launched non-nuc attack.

Graham: 1MT = a freight train loaded with HE from Washington to Los Angeles.

333t
3000⟌1,000,000
9000
1000

[? avg 333 tons per mile of freight train?)

How many tons per car?

cars per mile?

333
3000
999000

Schell: What of NATO FU policy and

McN: Stimson Center Report asserts wpns not needed

although US refuses to say NFU,
it's my firm judgment that at no time since 1960 would any US President under any provocation — even with Russian hordes pouring into West Germany* — would have initiated use of wpns.
yet we maintain these weapons [+ threats]

McN — The Reykjavik Summit

[* 1) yet they would have been used — by military, unit commanders! (+ this was deterrent, as in Cuba-II! to McN!]

(A)

and USG maintained this risky deployment

2) What if strong warning of incoming attack?!
No danger to

3) Did not McN lie about this?
Does he regret this? Did it have no effects?
Did he do everything he could to reduce risks, move back?! [see fall 1961! HM
Then, MIRV; ABM...

This nation was at risk for 40 years — we may have exag. risk, but it was real...

In the 7 years I was Sec., this nation was very, very close to nuclear war several times with SU      Cuba II; Berlin 1961... June '67, first time hotline was used: Kosygin, "If you want war, you'll get it."
The danger was real      [Nuc war?]
[but

Why did we have 6000 weapons? Because we feared they would
We stimulated the arms race — but we did it because (NATO was thought to be ~~also~~ inadequate)

We had to lend credibility to deterrent by being prepared to use them — if we do, we commit suicide.

McN "Let's get away from your (David Korn, Nation) question [what to learn from his/our past experience about the hubris of insiders — which prevents them from seeing what outsiders/external officials can see
— and how to get through this, persuade them...

[McN: we had reason to fear SU [+ ourselves!]
But let's focus on now [no excuse for hubris/deafness now — but

[Real answer: We/I (McN, JFK (B), I) did not feel obliged to inform, or willing to take political risks, of informing Congress + nation + public

of the realities of estimates, plans, dangers, threats, possibilities of decision-makers (as seen from Sept '61–63..
no missile gap; FU policies, dangers...
Collaborate with Congress, educate public, constituents
Expose nuclear policy, after debating in Congress.

Graham: We don't now live in a world where
zero is possible — inspection, institutions...

we do live in world where we can get down to
hundreds — which will take years; while we work on
[1-10?] verification, inspection, [enf. vs. war...]

[Still 2-tier system, just less extreme?
Will NNWS accept this — for how long?
as now?
and observe NPT (remain NNWS).

Martha Honey: Can we move toward the abolition
while expanding NATO (+ bombing ~~[illegible]~~ FY!]

McN: I can't imagine any decision that would
increase the risk of conflict with Russia more
than to expand NATO before reassuring Russia
about their own security; as their conventional forces
collapse, + NATO expands [with FY!]
"If I were Russian MOD, I'd commit suicide...

Bruce Blair:
[to Bill, "non-nuclear state" does not include
a state that is seeking nuclear weapons.
~~[illegible]~~ (Even if we're sure they don't have it.